Optimal Social Insurance and Health Inequality

Author: Anne Case, Anton E Kunst, Arnold B Mitnitski, Arnold B Mitnitski, Arnold B Mitnitski, Arnold B Mitnitski, Arnold B Mitnitski, Arnold B Mitnitski, Axel B�rsch-Supan, Axel B�rsch-Supan, Ay�seay�se Imrohoroglu, Ben J Heijdra, Carl-Johan Dalgaard, Carl-Johan Dalgaard, Charles I Jones, Christian Jaag, Christian Jaag, David Cutler, David E Bloom, Edward J Masoro, Eric French, Feldstein, Frank Caliendo, Gary Becker, Gary V Engelhardt, Giacomo Corneo, Hans Sinn, Holger Strulik, Holger Strulik, Holger Strulik, Isaac Ehrlich, James F Fries, James M Poterba, Jim Oeppen, John Beshears, John R Wolfe, Juan C Conesa, Juan C Conesa, Ken Harttgen, Kenneth Rockwood, Kevin S Milligan, Leonid A Gavrilov, Lixin Cai, Marcos Sanso, Marie-Louise Leroux, Marie-Louise Leroux, Martin Feldstein, Michael Grossman, Michael Kuhn, Olivier Bargain, Pierry Pestieau, Raj Chetty, Raj Chetty, Raj Chetty, Raj Chetty, Raj Chetty, Robert E Hall, Robert W Fogel, Roger Hartley, Samuel D Searle, Selahattin Imrohoroglu, Statistisches Bundesamt, Strulik, Thomas Mckeown, Tomas J Philipson, Volker Grossmann, Volker Grossmann
Publisher: Elsevier BV

ABOUT BOOK

This paper integrates into public economics a biologically founded, stochastic process of individual ageing. The novel approach enables us to quantitatively characterize the optimal joint design of health and retirement policy behind the veil of ignorance for today and in response to future medical progress. Calibrating our model to Germany, we find that future progress in medical technology calls for a potentially drastic increase in health spending that typically should be accompanied by a lower pension savings rate and a higher retirement age. Interestingly, medical progress and higher health spending are in conflict with the goal to reduce health inequality

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